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Abstract 
There is an emerging consensus that ideologically-based narratives play a central role in 
encouraging and sustaining radicalization to violence, and that preventing, arresting, or 
reversing radicalization requires some means by which to address the effects of these 
narratives. Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a broad umbrella phrase that covers a wide 
array of approaches that have been advanced to reduce the radicalizing effects of extremist 
narratives. There is considerably less agreement, however, regarding the most appropriate 
means by which the mitigation of extremist narratives might best be accomplished. An 
important emerging area of interest is the role of the Internet, both as a forum through which 
narratives are transmitted and as an avenue for delivering CVE programs. At present, very 
little is known about which principles and practices should inform online CVE initiatives. 
This study attempts to establish a foundation and framework for these programs: first, by 
identifying the concepts and constructs which may be most relevant to countering violent 
extremism online, and second, by examining the available material from six online CVE 
programs in relation to these concepts. This examination suggests that these programs are 
lacking strong theoretical foundations and do not address important elements of 
radicalization, such as contextual factors or identity issues. It is important that future iterations 
of CVE programs consider not just the specific content of the narratives, but also take into 
account why these narratives have resonance for particular individuals. 
 
Author’s Note: The authors wish to thank Public Safety Canada for their generous support of 
the research on which this article is based. The article has been adapted from material found 
in, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, “Assessment of the State of Knowledge: 
                                                 
 
  
 
 
 
 
52 
Connections between Research on the Social Psychology of the Internet and Violent 
Extremism.” The views expressed in the current article only engage the authors. 
Introduction 
 
Recently, the appearance of countering violent extremism (CVE) programs has 
garnered the attention of both researchers and policy makers alike. These programs are 
perceived by many as to central to the process of addressing the pressing need to combat 
radicalization to violence. At the same time, the relatively recent influx of these programs has 
raised a variety of questions. In particular, policy makers and practitioners are being asked to 
account for the effectiveness of these programs. Simply put, CVE programs have been around 
long enough for people to begin to inquire as to whether or not they work. Although CVE 
programs in the online milieu are comparatively new, they are facing similar questions. But 
while there is burgeoning interest in the evaluation of CVE programs, it is possible to argue 
that the foundations of these initiatives are not sufficiently understood, and that a better 
foundation is required before such assessment are undertaken.  
This study aims to better understand online CVE programs in two ways. First, by 
reviewing the literature on radicalization with an eye to identifying the concepts and 
constructs which may be most relevant to countering violent extremism online. This literature 
is then used to create a ‘good practices’ model for developing online CVE programs, based on 
recommendations across CVE scholars. Second, this model is applied to eight online CVE 
programs to examine to what extent, if any, they incorporate these practices. This study 
concludes by discussing possible implications of the findings.  
 
Radicalization and the Internet 
 
Broadly speaking, radicalization is the process by which individuals come to adopt 
radical or extremist views and ideas (Jensen, 2006). Radicalization might be best understood 
as the mental component of the process that leads to extremism. It has been described as the 
process by which individuals “are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief 
system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs toward extreme views” 
(Smith, 2009, p. 1). In and of itself, radicalism is not necessarily problematic (Kühle & 
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Lindekilde, 2010, p. 23). Radicalization is an issue, however, when it involves individuals 
gradually adopting views that favour, condone, or legitimize political violence as a legitimate 
avenue for action. Put another way, the concern here is with violent radicalization, whereby 
radical ideas develop into “a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts” 
(Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 798). It is important to note that violent radicalization is not 
limited to the perpetration of violence. Terrorist and extremist groups rely on a base of 
radicalized supporters, many of whom may never actually commit acts of violence, but who 
are nonetheless willing to support the use of violence for advancing their agenda. 
Despite several areas of disagrement regarding what exactly is covered by the concept 
of radicalization (Sedgwick, 2010), there is an emerging consensus on what factors converge 
to produce violent radicalization. Hafez and Mullins (2015), for example, identify four such 
factors: grievances, or “root causes” that set the stage for radicalization; social networks, 
which facilitate recruitment to the movement; ideology, the discursive narratives the bind 
individuals to the cause, and enabling environments and support structures, including the 
internet. The first three of these factors are very common to the radicalization literature and 
have been discussed at length by numerous authors. The fourth factor, enabling factors, have 
also been considered previously. However, the specific role of the internet in radicalization 
remains contentious. 
There seems to be little doubt that the Internet is increasingly implicated in the 
radicalization process. With regard to the West, it has been argued that radicalization is 
predominantly taking place online. There are many examples of individuals who have 
radicalized with the help of the Internet (Neumann, 2013). Jenkins (2010) remarks that many 
of the terrorists studied since 9/11 began their journeys on the Internet. This is hardly 
surprising, given the ubiquitous nature of the Internet in relation to Western lives, particularly 
the lives of young people who are the primary targets of radicalization efforts. 
There are a wide variety of perspectives on how online radicalization works. At the 
most basic level, the issue concerns the effects of exposure to particular forms of content. The 
Internet is a vast repository of information. In relation to radicalization, the Internet allows 
extremist groups to disseminate their messages and ideologies, as well as videos (Davies et 
al., 2015). These ideologies and videos have the potential to inspire radicalization. Pauwels 
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and Schils (2016) clearly demonstrate that active extremist content and exposure to extremism 
through new social media are strongly associated with self-reported political violence. On one 
hand, video images may produce a sort of “awakening” within individuals who are becoming 
aware of issues for the first time. Muslims in the West may be introduced to events in areas 
such as Iraq, Syria, Chechnya, and Palestine. On extremist sites, these events will be framed 
as atrocities to be avenged. On the other hand, for those who are already leaning toward 
extremist viewpoints, such content may serve to harden opinions. The power of these 
messages may be amplified by graphic video images. Sageman (2008a), for example, 
maintains that shocking videos may trigger a “sense of moral outrage” (Jasper, 1997) that 
could mobilize people to violence. More generally, research has confirmed that the Internet 
both creates a greater number of opportunities to be radicalized and accelerates the process of 
radicalization (von Behr, Reding, Edwards, and Gribbon, 2013). 
From a social psychological perspective, it is important to consider the context of 
exposure to and the context of reception of extremist contents and discourses. It is highly 
unlikely that mere exposure, in and of itself, is enough to promote radicalization and set 
individuals down the path to violence. Instead, responses to extremist content are conditioned 
by the environment within which they are received. Neumann (2013:435) contends that “no 
single item of extremist propaganda is guaranteed to transform people into terrorists. Rather, 
in most cases, online radicalization results from individuals being immersed in extremist 
content for extended periods of time, the amplified effects of graphic images and video, and 
the resulting emotional desensitization.” The themes of immersion and amplification are 
reflected in the characterization of online forums as “echo chambers”, places largely devoid 
of dissent, where moderating influences are drowned out by more extreme voices (Gerraerts, 
2012). Out of these insular environments emerges a powerful “groupthink” marked by 
violence. Attitudes supportive of violence may also be fostered by the form of the Internet, 
particularly what has been referred to as Web 2.0, with its emphasis on interactivity, graphic 
images, and video content. It has been suggested that extended exposure to and immersion in 
extremist content amplifies their effects (Neumann, 2013). The resulting desensitization to 
violence, or “online disinhibition” (Suler, 2004), further polarizes groups and may increase 
the likelihood of violent actions. 
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More generally, the primary role for the Internet in the radicalization process is the 
extent to which it facilitates social networks, ultimately culminating in virtual communities 
(Ducol, 2012). Bowman-Grieve (2009) argues that these communities are real social spaces 
that are important because “they encourage the construction of political and ideological 
discourses supporting and justifying the use of terrorism and political violence” (p. 990). 
Utilizing the example of Stormfront, a radical right-wing forum, Bowman-Grieve (2009) 
demonstrates how forums can provide validation for personal grievances, which in turn may 
result in individuals deepening their involvement with the extremist cause. Virtual 
communities such as Stormfront are key social arenas for the formation of the types of 
interpersonal bonds that are central to the radicalization process. Recent research indicates 
that the Internet is a signficant driving factor in the development of “radical contrast 
societies” (Koehler, 2014), which foster the transmission of violent radical ideologies and aids 
in translating these ideologies into political activism. 
Owing at least in part to social media, the Internet has fundamentally altered the 
manner in which individuals participate in social movements. Halverson and Way (2012) 
maintains that the Internet functions as a “contact point”, a “social nexus that facilitates the 
formation of relationships among previously unrelated entities” (p. 140). Drawing on the case 
of Colleen LaRose (a.k.a. JihadJane), Halverson and Way (2012) illustrate how social media 
enables isolated and marginalized individuals to experiment with and construct new identities 
as member of a community that values the individual. These new identities, and the 
concomitant acceptance, become a source of self-respect, dignity, and personal meaning. 
Extremist movements function online by offering individuals a connection and an opportunity 
to espouse their ideas in a supportive environment. In fact, one of the greatest challenges of 
the Internet is the manner in which it brings together people with anti-social interests and 
provides “easy access to ideological structures that provide some semblance of order, a 
renewed sense of self, and greater meaning to troubled realities” (Halverson & Way, 2012, p. 
148). In this way, the Internet has become the locus for gathering and coordinating 
marginalized individuals. 
In its most extreme form, this socializing aspect of the Internet can even be extended 
to include so-called “lone wolves”. Weimann (2012) maintains that lone-wolf terrorists are 
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not really alone. Few lone wolf attackers are really alone; despite the appearance of solitude, 
there is usually evidence of social ties linking them to others. Many of these lone-wolves have 
been radicalized via online platforms. Pantucci (2011) comments that “many of the [lone-
wolves] demonstrate some level of social alienation – within this context, the community 
provided by the Internet can act as a replacement social environment that they are unable to 
locate in the real world around them” (p. 34). Simply put, radicalization is a social 
phenomena, and lone-wolves are not exempted.  
There is, moreover, a potentially darker aspect to social networks and virtual 
communities. In contrast to the implied vision of individuals connecting with a like-minded 
community, it is also possible that there is a level of coercion involved. It is worth 
remembering that many of those individuals that extremist groups would like to radicalize and 
recruit are highly vulnerable. Extremist groups are primarily targeting individuals who are 
young, disillusioned, alienated, isolated and marginalized (Seib & Janbek, 2011; Decker & 
Pyrooz, 2015). These groups can use the Internet to manipulate grievances and lure 
individuals with promises of friendship, acceptance, and a sense of purpose. “Users may one 
day find themselves down the proverbial radical rabbit hole” (Thompson, 2011, p. 168). 
Sageman (2008a) holds that one of the most problematic aspects of the Internet is the degree 
to which individuals can be influenced by other participants on extremist forums. These 
milieus can do more than merely reinforce and solidify perspectives. Sageman indicates that 
individuals can have their minds changed through their participation in these forums. 
Not often recognized in the extant research on the role of the Internet in radicalization 
are the opportunities to use it to reverse the process of radicalization, and potentially counter 
violent extremist narratives. If the Internet is a powerful medium to first expose, and then 
facilitate the radicalization process of many individuals, such power to reach young 
populations can be used for pro-social purposes (Neumann, 2013; Bouchard & Thomas, 
2015). While many counter-narrative programs exist, their effectiveness as a dissuasive or 
preventative tool has yet to be assessed. The existing work on countering violent extremism 
online is reviewed below to frame the analysis of how they align with current online CVE 
programs. 
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Countering Violent Extremism Online 
 
Countering violent extremism is a broad umbrella phrase that covers a wide array of 
possible approaches to dealing with radicalization to extremist violence. To keep this 
literature review on point, several key distinctions must be made. First, the demarcation line 
between countering violent radicalization and deradicalization is often unclear. The concepts 
are related, connected by their focus on the cognitive (as opposed to behavioral) aspect of 
radicalization (Horgan, 2008). They are also linked by their mutual recognition of the 
importance of the importance of both narratives and credible messengers (Ashour, 2010). But 
there are also subtle differences between CVE and deradicalization, particularly the extent to 
which associated campaigns are designed as tools for prevention or intervention. Although 
most programs do not explicitly differentiate, they appear to predominantly preventive in 
nature.  
Second, CVE efforts may take place offline, online, or involve some combination of 
the two. In keeping with the focus of this paper, this review is primarily aimed at CVE 
initiatives that include at least some online component. Finally, online CVE programs are 
routinely divided into positive and negative measures. In general terms, positive CVE 
strategies are those that “seek to challenge extremist narratives and propaganda by producing 
counter-content,” while negative strategies are designed to “block, filter, take-down or censor 
extremist content” (Hussain & Saltman, 2014, p. 10). Western governments have tended to be 
more concerned with negative measures, technological “solutions” aimed at restricting the 
supply of extremist content on the Internet (for discussion of the full range of negative 
measures, see Stevens and Neumann, 2009). However, the potential effectiveness of such 
measures is subject to a number of practical (Briggs & Feve, 2013) and political (Hussain & 
Saltman, 2014) limitations. There is simply too much content on the Internet to try to sift 
through it all; it is too difficult and expensive to block, filter, or censor content; and even if it 
were possible, there are issues surrounding what properly constitutes “extremist content” that 
have thus far remained resistant to resolution. As Briggs and Feve (2013) note, “only a tiny 
fraction of extremist content is actually illegal” (p. 5). 
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While governments continue to mine for efficacious negative measures, attention has 
increasingly turned to trying more positive CVE means. For example, Stevens and Neumann 
(2009) have proposed a number of alternatives. They recommend empowering online 
communities by creating Internet user’s panels that would be charged with “raising awareness 
of reporting mechanisms for unacceptable content; monitoring companies’ complaints 
procedures; highlighting best and worst practices; facilitating partnerships between Internet 
companies and non-governmental organizations; and serving as an ombudsman of last resort” 
(p. 31). They further suggest reducing the appeal of extremist content by increasing media 
literacy through schools and other stakeholders. Finally, Stevens and Neumann (2009) support 
the establishment of a funding agency, independent of the government that could support the 
promotion of positive messages. Projects would be funded through small grants, and projects 
evaluated as having positive effects would be eligible to apply for more funding. 
Related to this last point, attention has increasingly turned to counter-messaging as a 
central response to violent extremism. In contrast to more negative and reactive orientations, 
counter-messaging is a more proactive approach, one that “focuses on reducing the demand 
for such content by undermining its appeal through offering credible alternatives” (Briggs & 
Feve, 2013, p. 5). Counter-messaging activities exist along a spectrum (Briggs & Feve, 2013). 
One type of counter-messaging involves government strategic communications, which 
essentially involve “getting the message out.” The goal of strategic communications is for the 
government to raise awareness of what it is doing and to forge positive relationships with key 
constituencies. Counter-messaging may also take the form of alternative narratives, positive 
stories about “social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy (Briggs & Feve, 
2013, p. 5). Schmid (2014) maintains that alternative narratives should be able to bridge the 
“us” versus “them” divide that is fostered by extremists and bring together people from all 
sides. They should focus more on “what we are for” and less on “what we are against”.  
Whereas strategic communication is the purview of government, alternative narratives may be 
issued both government and civil society activists and groups. Finally, counter-messaging 
may be realized through counter-narratives. This approach has become central to CVE, and is 
the focus of the remainder of this literature review. 
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A narrative has been described as a “simple unifying, easily-expressed story or 
explanation that organises people’s experience and provides a framework for understanding 
events” (Kilcullen, as cited by Schmid, 2014, p. 3). These interpretations, deeply rooted in 
culture, can in turn encourage specific types of personal action (Corman, 2011). Narratives 
are powerful because they hold the pieces of the story and “ring true” for members of the 
target audience (Goodall, 2010). Schmid maintains that one of the keys to understanding the 
ascendance of al-Qaeda’s ideology is understanding the extent to which it functions as a 
single narrative. “[It is] a unifying framework of explanations that provides its followers with 
an emotionally satisfying portrayal of the world in which they live and their role in it, offering 
them a sense of identity and giving meaning to their lives” (2014, p. 5). Extremist violence, 
then, is supported by convincing narratives that justify violence.  
To the extent that narratives form the foundation of the appeal of extremism, and if 
counter-narratives are to serve as a vital element in CVE strategies, it is important to 
understand what constitutes a strong narrative. Schmid (2014, p. 29) has identified the 
following as the ingredients of an effective narrative: 1. It has to articulate a clear, realistic 
and compelling mission purpose without getting entangled in sub-goals and details, but 
keeping the focus on long-term, overarching goals that have to be related to cultural norms 
and values as well as interests; 2. It has to have legitimacy in that it matches cultural and 
public norms and values and is seen by relevant publics as justified; 3. It has to hold the 
prospect of success and provide a feeling of progress towards its goals; 4. The narrative has to 
be presented in a consistent manner in order to be effective and withstand the attacks of 
counter-narratives that might cost it public support; and 5. The narrative must fit within an 
overall communication plan that reflects major themes of our own identity. 
Counter-narratives represent attempts to directly or indirectly challenge violent 
extremist messages (Briggs & Feve, 2013). These programs can function both online and 
offline, and many initiatives utilize both platforms. This approach is premised on trying to 
win the ‘battle of ideas.’ Counter-narratives highlight what is wrong with extremist 
ideologies, challenge assumptions, expose fallacies, and dismantle associated conspiracy 
theories (Schmid, 2014). It involves creating and promoting narratives that stand in opposition 
to those presented by extremists and is intended to undermine extremist ideologies and 
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compete for the ‘hearts and minds’ of potential recruits (Aldrich, 2014; Berger & Strathearn, 
2013). The idea behind counter-narratives is relatively straightforward, but its application in 
practice is much more complicated. Much of the literature on counter-narratives is currently 
centered on understanding how best to construct effective counter-narrative programs. 
 
Current Study 
 
The current study looks at whether current CVE programs are designed according to 
the ‘good practices’ put forward by CVE scholars. To do this, it first merges the work of three 
CVE scholars, who have outlined good practices for designing counter-narrative programs. 
Next, the grid is applied to six online CVE programs to examine the extent to which they 
incorporate or neglect these practices. Rather than representing an evaluation of CVE 
programs, which would require presently unavailable measure of effectiveness, this study 
instead take a first step towards assessing whether these programs are created on firm 
theoretical foundations based on the recommendations of CVE scholars. 
 
Designing Online CVE Programs 
 
The ‘good practices’ model utilized here draws on the efforts of previous CVE 
scholars who have identified what works, and what doesn’t, in the context of CVE programs. 
Specifically, the model is premised on work conducted by USAID (2009), the International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (Stevens & Neumann, 2009), the 
Institute for Strategic Dialogue (Briggs & Feve, 2013), and Braddock and Horgan (2015). 
These reports and articles were selected based on their focus on outlining the most effective 
measures for countering online violent extremist narratives. 
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Figure 1 combines the work of USAID (2009), Briggs and Feve (2013), Stevens and 
Neumann (2009), and Braddock and Horgan (2015) to outline the process required for 
building counter-narrative programs. Each set of CVE scholars focused on different aspects of 
building effective CVE programs. USAID (2009) primarily addressed contextual factors, to 
understand the specific mechanics of the radicalization process. Braddock and Horgan (2015) 
provided a detailed description of how to develop counter-narratives. Briggs and Feve (2013) 
concentrated on the medium through which CVE programs are delivered, distinguishing 
between government and non-government actors in providing counter-narratives. Stevens and 
Neumann (2009) primarily looked at the different types of approaches that may be used in an 
online context, distinguishing between positive and negative approaches, that is, the 
difference between removing and blocking online content versus providing content that 
counters radical perspectives, respectively. Together, these four approaches complement one 
another, providing a set of guidelines to consider when developing a CVE program. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the process of CVE development begins generally with the 
specification of a variety of contextual factors. First, identify the violent extremist 
organization or ideology that is to be the target of the intervention. Second, identify the 
individuals who are being targeted, or who are most likely to be targeted. This involves 
determining which individuals are most vulnerable to being influenced by the extremist 
narrative and are thereby more at risk of recruitment and/or radicalization. Third, determine 
the social processes used for radicalization. Social processes refer to the nature and mechanics 
of the radicalization process, and addresses questions such as: “Are individuals being 
recruited?” “At what venues is recruitment occurring?” and “What is the role of peer groups 
and social networks?” Finally, establish which types of drivers – political, socioeconomic, 
cultural, or a combination thereof – are pushing and/or pulling individuals toward violent 
extremist radicalization. Of note, the contextual approach presented by USAID (2009) 
assumes that the radicalization process rests largely on the active efforts of extremist groups 
and ideologues. This perspective is not without critics, as other researchers have argued for a 
more “bottom up” approach that emphasizes individual initiative (Sageman, 2008b; Hoffman, 
2008). Nonetheless, this framework is broadly useful for identifying and understanding those 
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factors that provide context and ‘set the stage’ for the acceptance of extremist narratives and 
radicalization to extremist violence. 
After the contextual factors have been assessed, the next step in the process is to 
determine what approach will be used. As noted earlier, there are a wide variety of possible 
CVE approaches from which to choose. The focus here is on counter-narratives. Braddock 
and Horgan (2015) maintain that effective counter-narratives must identify key themes in the 
extremist narrative and then develop responses that reveal incongruities and contradictions in 
those narratives. Other aspects of the counter-narrative would include contesting often 
misleading or invalid analogies that support extremist narratives and disrupting the binary 
nature of these narratives (Braddock and Horgan, 2015). Counter-narratives should not merely 
attempt to tear down the extremist narrative, but rather, rebut it and provide and alternative 
interpretation of reality.  
Regardless of the specific approach, all CVE initiatives must determine who will 
develop and deliver the program. This issue is particularly notable for counter-narrative 
programs. More precisely, the question is “what should be the role of government” in relation 
to counter-narratives? Briggs and Feve suggest that “governments must tread with caution in 
the area of counter-messaging … their efforts can be ineffective or even counter-productive 
when they act as the messenger, due to their credibility gap with target audiences, which often 
gets in the way of what they have to say” (2013, p. ii). This is not to say that there is no role 
for government. As noted above, governments can fruitfully engage in both strategic 
communications and alternative narratives. But much of the counter-narrative work 
increasingly relies on the identification of credible messengers, especially former violent 
extremists and survivors of extremist violence (Braddock and Horgan, 2015). These 
messengers have unique insights, and their experiences carry weight (e.g. Helmus et al., 
2013). Their messages are perceived as having greater authenticity. Credible messengers 
would also include scholars or persons that hold expertise in the information that is being 
countered. Using the Islamic State (IS) as an example, a credible messenger could be a 
religious scholar who can relay the proper interpretations of Islamic religious texts.  
The final considerations in Figure 1 are the “how” of the program (that is, how is the 
program to be delivered), and the nature of the measures employed. As noted earlier, CVE 
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efforts, including counter-narratives, can be delivered online, offline, or via a hybrid 
approach, and can consist of positive or negative measures (or some combination of the two). 
Together, all of these considerations provide a method to systematically outline key elements 
of CVE efforts across initiatives. 
 
Programs for Countering Violent Extremism Online 
 
The current section applies these best practices identified across CVE scholars to 
assess whether they are being implemented in current online CVE programs. Six online CVE 
programs were selected for review, based on four main criteria. The first consideration was 
practical, requiring programs that have detailed information on their objectives, their target 
population, and how their objectives are implemented. Second, consistent with the research 
objectives, all programs had to have an online component. Third, programs were favoured, to 
the extent that they appeared to contain many of the elements associated with “good 
practices” for countering violent extremism, based on consistencies with the radicalization 
literature. Lastly, we attempted to capture a range of programs to reflect the diversity of 
approaches currently being implemented to counter violent extremism. 
While all programs have an online component they vary in the extent to whether they 
are delivered in online or offline contexts. Across the six programs, the majority targeted 
jihadist-motivated extremists (n=3), while two targeted all types of violent extremism, and 
one focused only on white supremacist motivated extremists. The programs also differed in 
terms of how they attempted to counter violent extremism. Most programs aimed to provide 
counter-narratives, offering evidence-based arguments to counter extremist voices (n=4), 
while others focused on educating youth on appropriate Internet behaviour (n=1), or 
educating and providing recommendations to policymakers on violent extremism (n=1). All 
programs were implemented in Western contexts, including Australia, Canada, and the United 
States. This section first provides a description of each program and then examines the extent 
to which they align with guidelines outlined by CVE scholars. 
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1. Youth online and at risk: Radicalization facilitated by the Internet  
 
Youth online and at risk: Radicalization facilitated by the Internet is a program delivered as a 
report produced by the RCMP (http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/rad/rad-eng.htm).  It is a 
four-step program targeting parents, caregivers, and teachers of youth who are active online 
(RCMP-GRC, 2011). This first step encourages two-way conversation between an adult and 
youth concerning online content appropriateness and expectations of behavior when content is 
found to be inappropriate. The second step is to leverage existing programs. This step 
involves developing ways to keep youth safe from Internet threats. Some examples that are 
stated in the report are software controls, monitoring download activity, keeping the computer 
in an open space/community area, developing “what if” scenarios, and consulting website 
reviews. The third step is to reach out to their space, emphasizing the importance of genuine 
connections. The fourth step is reporting material of concern. This highlights the importance 
of avoiding inappropriate content as well as reporting this content when it is found.   
 
2. Campaign Against Violent Extremism 
 
The Campaign Against Violent Extremism (CAVE) is a project jointly created by the BC 
Muslim Association and the RCMP (The BC Muslim Association, 2015). The program is 
premised on notion that the misunderstanding of Islam and improper interpretation of 
religious Islamic texts are key drivers in today’s conflicts. In response, the principal goal of 
this program is to increase the awareness and knowledge of ‘mainstream’ Islam, offer correct 
interpretations of Islamic texts, and counter those voices that are offering radical 
interpretations of Islamic religious doctrine. CAVE delivered three community forums in 
Surrey and Burnaby, BC, in 2014. Advertised with the tagline “Dare to be Informed,” these 
forums are designed as community educational experiences, as opportunities for members of 
the public to ask questions and raise their concerns. (The BC Muslim Association, 2015). 
According to Mufti Assim Rashid, the objectives of CAVE are to deal with the radicalization 
of youth, to create a preventive campaign to educate Muslims and non-Muslims, and to tackle 
how non-Muslims feel about Muslims.  
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3. Against Violent Extremism  
 
Against Violent Extremism (AVE) was originally launched at the 2011 Summit Against 
Violent Extremism in Dublin. It is a unique private sector partnership between the Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue (ISD), Google Ideas, the Gen Next Foundation and rehabstudio and is 
currently being managed by ISD in London. AVE is a global network of former extremists 
and survivors of extremism that leverages the lessons, experiences and networks of 
individuals who have dealt first-hand with extremism.  Its official aims are “to prevent the 
recruitment of ‘at risk’ youth and encouraging the disengagement of those already involved.” 
AVE uses technology to connect, exchange, and disseminate information and perspectives on 
violent extremism. The network does not focus on any particular extremist narrative or 
ideology; instead, it is dedicated to countering all types of violent extremism (from far right 
and far left to AQ-linked and inspired and gangs). 
 
AVE is a private sector venture with no government assistance. Members – subject to 
approval from management – join this network from all over the globe to interact and 
converse with former extremists and each other to combat extremist narratives. AVE is 
designed to be inclusive. Members have the option of adding their own counter-narrative 
project to the wide array already available. Through its various media platforms, members can 
stay in touch, share ideas, collaborate, find investment and partners, and project their 
messages to wider audiences. 
 
4. EXIT White Power 
 
EXIT White Power is one of several initiatives offered by All Together Now, a national, 
independent, not-for-profit organization dedicated to erasing racism in Australia. All Together 
Now seeks to achieve its vision of an Australia that embraces cultural diversity and is free 
from racism by promoting the prevention of racism using creating innovative, evidence-based 
and effective social marketing that is positive, provocative and courageous. Its work targets 
the behaviour of the 40 percent of adult Australians who are ambivalent about cultural 
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diversity by engaging the 50 percent of adult Australians who are already positive about 
diversity and encourage them to speak to their ambivalent friends, colleagues and family 
members. All Together Now’s strategic plan is to facilitate a national conversation about 
racism that will lead to: improved racial literacy among Australians; increased confidence 
among Australians to speak up when they witness racism; change in behaviour of the 40 
percent of Australians who are ambivalent about cultural diversity; and a greater 
understanding of the types of activities that effectively reduce racism in the Australian context 
(http://alltogethernow.org.au).  
 
As part of All Together Now’s overall program, EXIT White Power (EWP) was launched in 
October 2012. Utilizing a website (http://exitwhitepower.com), Facebook discussion page 
(https://www.facebook.com/wptalksau) and Twitter (https://twitter.com/exitwhitepower), the 
goal of EWP is to challenge recruitment efforts of white extremist organizations to prevent 
more young people from becoming involved in white nationalism and white supremacy. By 
monitoring the content of white supremacist discussions online and responding by writing and 
publishing evidence-based counter-arguments that debunk myths and conspiracy theories, 
EWP seeks to build resilience to white nationalism by planting a seed of doubt among young 
men at risk of being involved. EWP has found that writing counter-arguments and ridiculing 
the narratives, ideology and conspiracy theories of white supremacists can help to dissuade 
young people from becoming involved. It also concludes that Trojan advertising coupled with 
Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) and discussion on white supremacy forums have thus far 
been the most successful tactics for attracting attention to evidence-based counter-arguments. 
 
EWP notes that individuals who are at risk of radicalisation may become more entrenched if 
counter-narrative activities are not combined with an opportunity for young people to have 
two-way conversation with the experts. To this end, EWP has focused on creating a resource 
for front-line workers so that they are better equipped to have this conversation with at risk 
young people. The publication, Responding to White Supremacy: A Guide for Frontline 
Workers, is available for download on the EWP website. It is intended for use by all frontline 
workers, including youth workers, social workers, counsellors, psychologists, teachers and 
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police, and includes information on: the white supremacist movement in Australia; why 
people get involved in white supremacy and who is most at risk; how white supremacy groups 
operate; the radicalisation process and how to recognise it; and assisting someone involved/at 
risk of involvement in white supremacy group. 
 
The website has several other notable features. There is an Information for Community 
Workers section that, in addition to the frontline workers’ guide, includes additional sources 
of information on how “you and your community can respond to individuals at risk of 
involvement in white supremacy.” There is also a section on How to Spot a White Nationalist 
that highlights the symbols, words and numbers associated with white nationalism. EWP 
notes that “by being confident that you have identified their association with white 
nationalism, you will be able to confront the person directly about their involvement.” A 
section titled I Need Help offers directions on how one can leave, or help a friend escape 
from, a white power group. This section also encourages people that have information about a 
threat of violence from a white nationalist to report it to the local police station or to the 
National Security Hotline. Finally, the website has archived entries related to Conspiracy 
Theories, Identity, and Problems in Society, as well as a forum. 
 
5. Think Again, Turn Away 
 
The Think Again, Turn Away campaign was developed and launched by the USA State 
Department in December 2013 (Katz, 2014). According to its Facebook page, Think Again, 
Turn Away’s “… mission is to expose the facts about terrorists and their propaganda. Don’t 
be misled by those who break up families and destroy their true heritage.” This program 
utilizes a broad spectrum of social media platforms in attempts to dispute and undermine 
extremist information in various ways. One way in which they do this is by engaging 
extremists in debates (Katz, 2014). More controversially, extremist narratives are also 
challenged through the posting of satirical mock recruitment videos. One video featured the 
phrases such as, “Travel is inexpensive because you won’t need a return ticket”, “useful new 
skills such as blowing up mosques and crucifying and executing Muslims” (Hansen, 2014). 
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The debut video released by the campaign featured graphic images of the Islamic State (IS) 
committing atrocities, including beheadings. By highlighting the brutality of IS, the videos 
were intended to dissuade potential jihadists from joining IS. 
 
6. Muflehun 
 
Muflehun is an independent think tank that specializes in preventing radicalization and 
countering violent extremism. Its initial focus is to first, understand the nature of the threat of 
violent extremism, and second, develop effective, innovative, and research-driven 
preventative programs within a religious paradigm. Initiated by the Muslim American 
community, Mulfehun believes that preventing radicalization, violent extremism and other 
threats from taking root is the first step for ensuring a safe civic society. The word muflehun 
is based in Quranic verse (Q3:104) and means “those who will be successful.”  
 
Let there be a group (community) from amongst you that invites towards 
good, enjoins what is right (reasonable & just), and forbids what is wrong; 
and they will be the successful ones (muflehun). 
 
Muflehun’s stated vision is to help establish a community that promotes good work and 
justice, while peacefully working against wrongs and injustice. Its mission is to conduct 
independent research and provide recommendations to policymakers and the American 
Muslim community, as well as develop programs that directly and indirectly use faith-based 
values to: Promote the continued integration of the community within the larger society; 
enable civic engagement through awareness and promotion of available resources; and 
facilitate the fulfillment of social responsibilities by utilization and expansion of service 
channels. 
 
Muflehun is a non-profit organization. Financed by contributions from individuals, 
foundations, and corporations, it is an independent and strictly non-partisan organization. It 
does not have any government funding; rather, it relies entirely on support from private 
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sources. Muflehun purports to offer programs in several countries covering the Countering 
Violent Extremism landscape (although there are no specific programs listed on its website). 
Muflehun’s CVE Programming Landscape is presented in Figure 4. Muflehun primarily 
engages through its website, http://muflehun.org/, which includes information on CVE News, 
CVE-related events, and a blog. 
 
7.  Don’t be a Puppet 
Don’t be a puppet is an initiative developed and launched by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in consultation with community leaders and other partners in February of 
2016. Utilizing a website (https://cve.fbi.gov/info-discussion-leaders.html), the aim of the 
program is to engage and educate youth on the often deceptive realities of violent extremism. 
The site has five main sections that utilize quizzes and videos amongst other interactive 
materials: 1. What is Violent Extremism 2. Why do people become violent extremists? 3. 
What are known violent extremist groups? 4. How do violent extremists make contact? 5. 
Who do violent extremists affect? Once youths have worked through these sections they are 
prompted to a final section – Where to get help – where upon completion they receive an FBI 
certificate that they can sign and keep. These certificates are then used as a metric to 
determine how many people the program has reached. 
8.  Open Letter to our Sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq 
The ‘Open Letter to our Sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq’ campaign was launched in 
June of 2015 by Mothers for Life. Essentially, it is an open letter that utilizes counter-
narratives. The original letter’s structure was designed by the German Institute on 
Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS) in conjunction with mothers from 
seven different countries. The letter was distributed across many different media platforms, 
including the social media giant, Facebook and a PDF version of it is available on the GIRDS 
website (http://girds.org/mothersforlife/open-letter-to-our-sons-and-daughters). A gripping 
passage from the letter reads, 
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Allah has enjoined on man kindness to his parents; in pain did his mother bear 
him, and in pain, did she give him birth” (Quran:46:15). We, your mothers, 
taught you many things but most importantly justice, freedom, honour and 
compassion for all of God’s creation and for every human being. Every human 
being belongs to the wonder of life. That wonder of life in all its essence, that 
we were part of together and were meant to be together, was taken from us. 
Why?  
Someone, told you that another life, beyond this one that we share together is 
more important, more valuable than the life with your mother. They told you to 
leave us and fight for justice and honour and eventually give up your life in 
order to find “that other life.  
The power and far reach of this letter can be inferred from the statistics from the GIRDS 
website which state that the letter was:  reported on by news outlets 1,785 times; shared 7000 
time on Facebook; translated into eight languages – Turkish, German, Arabic, French, Italian, 
Dutch, Belgian, and Spanish; responded to by ISIS within three and a half hours after 
publishing it and; mothers from many more countries have since reached out for help.  
 
Application of Good Practices 
 
The list of CVE programs reviewed here is not intended to be representative or 
exhaustive. Rather, the aim is to offer a scan of the breadth of available online programs. But 
even this modest sampling provides some important insights into how we should be thinking 
about these programs. Specifically, applying the ‘good practices’ grid to existing programs 
demonstrates the variation across programs, and the extent to which they are currently 
following approaches identified by CVE scholars. 
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Table 1. Summary of Online CVE Programs 
 
 Contextual Factors By Whom? How? Measures? 
 
Identify 
ideology/ 
VEO 
Identify  
at risk / 
targeted 
Identify 
social 
processes  
Identify 
driver(s)  
Govt. 
Credible 
Mssngr. 
Online Offline Positive Negative 
Youth Online 
and at Risk 
          
Campaign 
Against Violent 
Extremism 
(CAVE) 
          
Against Violent 
Extremism 
(AVE) 
          
EXIT White 
Power (EWP) 
          
Think Again, 
Turn Away 
          
Muflehun           
Don’t be a 
Puppet 
          
Open Letter to 
our Sons and 
Daughters in 
Syria and Iraq 
         
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Contextual factors 
 
First, CVE interventions pay scant attention to contextual factors. The programs were 
usually specific about the target ideology or violent extremist group of interest (see Table 1), 
but showed little interest in the types of social processes and push/pull factors that often 
contribute to the process of radicalization. This narrowness of approach has potentially 
negative implications for the effectiveness of CVE efforts. However, this also represents one 
of the most challenging factors for assessing the following programs, as our assessments are 
based on open source materials and we do not have access to the decision-making process, or 
specific details of designing the programs. For instance, Muflehun is premised on research-
driven preventative programs; however, they do not provide a demonstration of explicitly 
adhering to these principles. Similarly, Youth Online and at Risk, lists as part of their strategy 
to develop contacts and genuine relationships with youth who are potentially at risk. While 
this may represent an effort to counter exposure and influence of extremist perspectives, the 
link between this approach and the outcome is broad and not clearly defined as part of the 
aim.  
 
By whom? 
 
Another important variation in programs relates to those charged with delivering the 
messages. Credible messengers are critical to several of the programs, present in six of the 
eight CVE programs discussed. The BC Muslim Association, particularly Mufti Aasim 
Rashid, is essential to the CAVE program. Muflehun similarly is rooted in the American 
Muslim community. AVE is an example of the need to incorporate the voices and experiences 
of survivors of extremist violence and former violent extremists. Other programs, such as 
Youth Online and as Risk and EWP, are closely tied to important stakeholders such as 
teachers and social workers. Open Letter to our Sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq is 
created by and backed by mothers around the world. Two programs, Think Again, Turn Away 
and Don’t be a Puppet, are run solely by the government. It appears that many programs are 
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cognizant of, and have taken steps to address, the ‘credibility gap’ that is perceived to hamper 
government efforts. 
Perhaps not coincidentally, the Think Again, Turn Away initiative has been the most 
controversial of the programs, and has been the most negatively received. This campaign is 
widely criticized by experts and the media as legitimizing terrorists, giving them a platform to 
further spread their propaganda (Katz, 2014; Edelman, 2014). In response to the video 
showing IS barbarism referenced earlier, Kohlmann (cited by Gearan, 2014) argues that “The 
problem with this video is the same problem that seems to happen over and over again with 
these type of initiatives. They don’t seem to have a clear picture of what audience they are 
trying to reach, or how to influence them.” Kohlmann further adds that “most of the 
Westerners trying to join ISIS are actually enthused by videos of executions and suicide 
bombings, not deterred by them”. 
 
Measures? 
 
In keeping with the philosophical priorities that underlie CVE, the programs here are 
predominantly centered around the presentation of information. This is consistent with what 
Stevens and Neumann (2009) have identified as ‘positive’ approaches, using education and 
alternate information to counter radical messages. Positive approaches were observed among 
five of the six programs. For instance, CAVE provided a venue with which to counter radical 
interpretations, providing alternate perspectives. Open Letter to our Sons and Daughters in 
Syria and Iraq also chose to counter interpretations by highlighting specific passages from the 
Quran in specific relation to mothers. This is also consistent with AVE and EXIT White 
Power which both have as a primary aim to challenge extremist beliefs. However, at least one 
of the approaches incorporated more ‘negative’ tactics. While the Youth Online and at Risk 
program delivered by the RCMP makes no mention of removing extremist material from 
websites, this program does encourage the monitoring of download activity and minimizing 
any contact with radical content.  
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 At the same time, there are notable differences in the manner in which the information 
is conveyed. These distinctions can be considered along two close related dimensions: one 
regarding the level of “activity”, the other reflected in the degree of “online-ness.” For 
example, both of the Canadian initiatives, Youth Online and at Risk and Campaign Against 
Violent Extremism (CAVE), might be characterized as being relatively passive in their online 
approaches. The former purely involves the provision of information, while that latter really 
takes place offline. In both cases, the Internet is more peripheral to radicalization efforts. In 
contrast, AVE, Think Again, Turn Away, and Don’t be a Puppet are much more actively 
engaged in online milieus. The first two being examples of the trend of initiatives utilizing the 
widest possible range of social media platforms.  
 
Discussion  
 
The eight CVE programs presented in this paper provided a range of venues through which 
organizations have attempted to counter radicalization processes. The programs reviewed 
tended to focus on providing counter-narratives, that is, alternative sources of knowledge 
regarding political, ideological, and religious material found online.  
Although CVE efforts in relation to radicalization constitute a relatively new field of 
study, attention has increasingly turned to the question of evaluation: what works? And how 
do we know? Assessing the utility and effectiveness of CVE programs is inherently difficult 
(Vidino, 2010). First, the lack of a clear definition of CVE makes it hard to evaluate the CVE 
agenda as whole (McCants & Watts, 2012). Second, the “success” of any program is most 
likely to be a matter of degree. To put it in more concrete terms, Vidino (2010, p. 10) poses 
the following question: “If, for example, one hundred individuals go through a 
deradicalization program and only a handful of them revert to terrorism, how is the program 
to be assessed?” Third, appraising the outcome of CVE programs is particularly challenging 
because it involves trying to measure a non-outcome; that is, one has to demonstrate that 
(some proportion) of subjects did not engage in violent extremism because of exposure to, or 
participation in, a specific program or intervention (Aldrich, 2014). While it may not be 
impossible to prove a negative, it is nonetheless very problematic.  
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In addition to the problems highlighted above, it is reasonable to ask whether there is 
any utility in evaluating CVE initiates as they are currently being conceptualized. Before we 
try to determine if programs are effective, however that may be defined, it is important to 
ascertain whether these programs have been built on solid theoretical foundations. Any policy 
prescription should, at a minimum, explicitly take into account the putative causes of the 
phenomenon of interest: CVE programs should be firmly grounded in the “causes” of 
radicalization to violent extremism. Based on the programs reviewed above, there would 
appear to be a substantial gap between what is known about the factors that are purported to 
animate the radicalization process and the factors that CVE interventions attempt to address. 
Understanding the radicalization process is greatly complicated by a lack of consensus 
with regard to the causes of radicalization. In the absence of solid empirical evidence, pet 
theories and speculation abound. However, there seems to be an emerging consensus that a 
wide range of interrelated factors are implicated. “It seems that radicalization is a complex 
and highly individualized process, often shaped by a poorly understood interaction of 
structural and personal factors” (Vidino, 2010, p. 3). This characterization, emphasizing 
complexity and interaction, is at odds with the comparatively narrow focus of online CVE 
strategies. While almost all of the programs targeted a group or an ideology, none made any 
mention of social processes or socioeconomic, political, or cultural drivers. Given their 
incomplete theoretical underpinnings, it would be difficult for these programs to meet their 
desired aims. 
Individuals are drawn into violent extremism for a host of reasons, many of which are 
unrelated to ideology. For example, Venhaus (2010) offers a typology of potential extremists 
comprised of four categories of ‘seekers,” individuals with unfulfilled needs that may turn to 
violent extremism as a means of defining themselves: “Revenge seekers need an outlet for 
their frustration, status seekers need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and 
thrill seekers need adventure” (p. 1). Two of these groups, status and identity seekers, are 
especially relevant in light of the perspectives advanced in this paper. CVE programs are not 
geared toward these individuals. More broadly, it is concerning that none of the programs 
reviewed here attempted to incorporate elements of social psychology. If individuals are 
motivated not by ideology but by needs rooted in identity, belonging, recognition and respect, 
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refuting erroneous ideological interpretations, correcting historical inaccuracies, and 
unravelling conspiracy theories would be insufficient to divert them from the path of violent 
radicalization. Problematic ideologies provide a convenient focal point for intervention, but 
ameliorating them cannot offset or replace the social bonds that are being forged, both offline 
and online. Generally speaking, voluntarily abandoning one’s perceived social support 
network would be perceived as being irrational. This calculus is not necessarily altered by the 
fact that the context is violent extremism. This realization presents a thorny but nonetheless 
crucial dilemma: CVE programs cannot merely be oriented toward preventing, arresting or 
reversing the process of radicalization to extremist violence. They must also with grapple with 
an equally compelling consideration: with what are the perceived ‘benefits’ of radicalization 
to be replaced? 
 
Policy Implications 
 
Currently CVE approaches have been classified based on their target audience and 
approaches used. While these centre on recruitment methods by groups, we would also 
encourage tailoring programs according to the specific methods through which violent 
extremists, or individuals ‘at-risk’ of violent extremism used the Internet – differentiating 
between those who use it as a key resource to develop and shape radical beliefs, from those 
for which the Internet is a trigger or reinforcer of radical beliefs. Targeting these individuals 
in particular, who are using it to reinforce, from those who use it as solely an initial trigger of 
radical beliefs – may require an entirely different approach.  
Further, most of the programs presented are implicitly or explicitly directed toward 
jihadist violence. One endeavour, EXIT White Power (EWP), focuses on white nationalist and 
white supremacist extremism, while Against Violent Extremism (AVE) takes a much more 
expansive view and attempts to address violent extremism in all of its various guises. The 
(over)emphasis on Muslim radicalization has been noted by CVE critics. For example, Berger 
(2011) has commented that “(i)f the first step in making Muslims feel less alienated is to 
single them out for remedial social engineering, then we have a problem before we even 
start”. This singling out seems especially misguided in light of the fact that, in the US, violent 
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right-wing extremists have proved to a much more lethal threat. “Since Sept. 11, 2001, nearly 
twice as many people have been killed by white supremacists, anti-government fanatics and 
other non-Muslim extremists than by radical Muslims…” (Shane, 2015). Against this 
backdrop, Western governments would be well served to adopt a broader stance on 
radicalization programs. 
Previous studies have also emphasized the role of the Internet in serving as a cognitive 
resource, to learn about religion (Helmus et al., 2013). This information seeking may lead 
individuals to come across extremist perspectives that shaped their radical beliefs. Providing 
alternative resources, specifically developing online resources for individuals who may be 
looking for – religious, political and ideological – resources. While the programs mentioned 
in the report aimed to provide counter-narratives and messaging, we would recommend 
furthering these efforts by providing credible information resources online for individuals to 
access. This may assist in them falling upon more nuanced and less Manichean discourses. 
However, recognizing that alternative cognitive resources, while valuable, will likely never 
completely overshadow radical perspectives, we would also recommend developing school 
programs that address digital literacy. These programs could foster critical thinking regarding 
ideological content available online.  
Lastly, findings from the CVE programs also emphasize the need for 1. counter-
narrative programs to be guided by theory; and 2. development of systematic evaluations of 
these programs. The first point extends from the above discussion that CVE programs should 
be built on strong theoretical foundations. This is particularly important for a phenomenon in 
which there is relatively few empirical studies on either radicalization or counter-
radicalization processes, and where this process has been described as a “poorly understood 
interaction of structural and personal factors” (Vidino, 2010, p. 3). Theory can guide towards 
the most effective measures, rather than using measures that are argued to be intuitive, which 
is particularly important in a mis-understood process. This leads to the second point, 
evaluation of programs. Given the poorly understood nature of counter-violent extremism 
programs, we encourage systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of these programs. This is 
particularly important in light of allegations that these programs may even be counter-
productive. For instance, this has been illustrated in the case of the US’ Governments effort to 
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counter ISIS messages through their Twitter Account, Think Again, Turn Away, which has 
been publicly critiqued for not only being effective, but also providing a platform for terrorist 
groups to legitimize their organization, with individual members engaging in direct, open 
debates with government actors. 
Our analysis aimed to provide a review of the literature on ‘good practices’ for 
designing programs that aim to counter violent extremism online, and an examination of 
whether current CVE programs adopt these principles. Our findings suggest that online CVE 
programs are lacking strong theoretical foundations and do not address important elements of 
radicalization, such as contextual factors or identity issues. Pathways towards radicalization 
appear as much the result of several identified pre-conditions as the product of relational and 
developmental configurations that may occur online and/or offline. This illustrates the need to 
pay close attention to the multiplicity of causal factors involved in such processes as well as 
the ways they interact together (Ducol 2015), as not doing so may hinder efforts aiming to 
prevent radicalization processes.Given increases in online CVE programs, this paper hopes to 
have served as a further step towards understanding this evolving landscape, and how online 
programs may be designed in order to effectively prevent and, even counter radicalization 
processes. 
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